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Deep-sea mining is likely to result in biodiversity loss, and the significance of this
to ecosystem function is not known. “Out of kind” biodiversity offsets substituting
one ecosystem type (e.g., coral reefs) for another (e.g., abyssal nodule fields) have
been proposed to compensate for such loss. Here we consider a goal of no
net loss (NNL) of biodiversity and explore the challenges of applying this aim to
deep seabed mining, based on the associated mitigation hierarchy (avoid, minimize,
remediate). We conclude that the industry cannot at present deliver an outcome of
NNL. This results from the vulnerable nature of deep-sea environments to mining
impacts, currently limited technological capacity to minimize harm, significant gaps in
ecological knowledge, and uncertainties of recovery potential of deep-sea ecosystems.
Avoidance and minimization of impacts are therefore the only presently viable means
of reducing biodiversity losses from seabed mining. Because of these constraints,
when and if deep-sea mining proceeds, it must be approached in a precautionary
and step-wise manner to integrate new and developing knowledge. Each step should
be subject to explicit environmental management goals, monitoring protocols, and
binding standards to avoid serious environmental harm and minimize loss of biodiversity.
“Out of kind” measures, an option for compensation currently proposed, cannot
replicate biodiversity and ecosystem services lost through mining of the deep seabed
and thus cannot be considered true offsets. The ecosystem functions provided by
deep-sea biodiversity contribute to a wide range of provisioning services (e.g., the
exploitation of fish, energy, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics), play an essential role in
regulatory services (e.g., carbon sequestration) and are important culturally. The level of
“acceptable” biodiversity loss in the deep sea requires public, transparent, and well-
informed consideration, as well as wide agreement. If accepted, further agreement
on how to assess residual losses remaining after the robust implementation of the
mitigation hierarchy is also imperative. To ameliorate some of the inter-generational
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inequity caused by mining-associated biodiversity losses, and only after all NNL
measures have been used to the fullest extent, potential compensatory actions would
need to be focused on measures to improve the knowledge and protection of the deep
sea and to demonstrate benefits that will endure for future generations.
Keywords: no net loss, biodiversity offsetting, compensation, mitigation hierarchy, deep-sea mining,
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
INTRODUCTION
The Potential Impact of Deep-Sea Mining
There is increasing interest worldwide in the potential for
deep-sea mining to serve as an engine for “Blue Growth”
and to drive sustainable economic development (European
Commission, 2012; Wedding et al., 2015). Most deep-sea
ecosystems targeted for mining have some combination of
ecological characteristics that make them particularly sensitive
to anthropogenic disturbance, such as being largely pristine,
highly structured, very diverse, dominated by rare species and
(extremely) slow to recover. Accordingly, there is increasing
concern that the direct and indirect impacts of mineral extraction
in the deep sea will result in a significant loss of biological
diversity (herein referred to as biodiversity) (CBD, 1992;
Wedding et al., 2015). Direct impacts occur through the removal
of target material and associated organisms within the mine
site and include the destruction of biota as well as habitat
loss, fragmentation, and modification through altered mineral
and sediment composition, geomorphology, and biogeochemical
processes (Ellis, 2001; Van Dover, 2014; Jones et al., 2017).
Potential indirect impacts on the seabed and water column
both within and outside of the directly mined area include
the smothering of habitat and biota, interference with feeding
activities, and the release and spread of nutrient-rich and
toxin-laden water from the generation of plumes (Ellis, 2001;
Boschen et al., 2013). Additional potentially harmful diffuse
effects include those from light, noise and electromagnetic
disturbance (Van Dover, 2014; MIDAS, 2016). The scale over
which these indirect impacts are likely to occur is largely
unknown and most of the effects remain unstudied. The three
mineral resource types commonly considered for deep-sea
mining each have their own specific environmental contexts,
which have each been the subject of targeted scientific study and
some proposed management measures—polymetallic nodules
(nodules), cobalt crusts (crusts), and seafloor massive sulfides
(SMS) associated with hydrothermal vents (vents). However,
despite the considerable differences among these resources and
the types of ecosystems within which they are located, the scales
implicated by deep-sea mining suggest that exploitation of all
three resource classes will yield significant biodiversity loss,
indicating that a precautionary approach is warranted (Levin
et al., 2016).
The Importance of Deep-Sea Biodiversity
While biodiversity loss is recognized as a major global
environmental problem (Weikard, 2002), the importance of
biodiversity in the deep ocean merits clarification, particularly
given that most species (both prokaryotes and eukaryotes)
remain undiscovered or unidentified (Higgs and Attrill, 2015;
Sinniger et al., 2016; Shulse et al., 2017). Deep-sea biodiversity
is valued both for the ecosystem services it provides and for
underpinning the health of the oceans by enabling a range
of ecological and evolutionary functions that are viewed as
necessary to productive, sustainable ecosystems (Thurber et al.,
2014). There is increasing reliance on the provisioning services
of the deep sea through fisheries, energy and mineral extraction,
pharmaceutical prospecting, and the search for industrial
agents and bioinspired materials that all derive from deep-sea
biodiversity (Mengerink et al., 2014). Deep-sea communities and
organisms also play important roles within climate regulation
(through the burial of carbon and mitigation of climate
change and ocean acidification) and the production of oxygen
(through the recycling of nutrients required by phytoplankton).
Biodiversity facilitates the provision of food, refuge, habitat, and
nursery grounds for species responsible for the services described
above. These services, in addition to the intrinsic values ascribed
to biodiversity, are often called natural capital and describe the
benefits that humans derive from the effective functioning and
existence of biodiversity (Soulé, 1985; Hungate and Cardinale,
2017). In the deep ocean, where there is great uncertainty about
natural processes, vulnerabilities and the consequences of human
impacts, biodiversity serves as a form of evolutionary insurance,
acting as a living library that facilitates adaptation and ecosystem
resilience to changing environmental conditions (Mace et al.,
2014). With the current absence of a detailed understanding of
ecological relationships, the precautionary approach advocated
by several international commitments and legal obligations
including that of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD,
1992) suggests that we assume that healthy, functioning deep-sea
biodiversity is, as in other realms, highly desirable and provides
services beneficial to humankind.
Managing Impacts on Deep-Sea
Biodiversity
In recognizing the importance of the marine environment and
its living resources, the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) sets forth a prescriptive regime for
the seabed “Area” beyond national jurisdiction and its mineral
resources, designed to achieve international control, sharing
of benefits (monetary and non-monetary), and environmental
protection. UNCLOS designates the international deep seabed
and its mineral resources as the “CommonHeritage of Mankind,”
to be managed on behalf of humankind as a whole, including
future generations (Bourrel et al., 2016; Jaeckel et al., 2017;
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UNCLOS, Art. 136). The International Seabed Authority (ISA),
established under UNCLOS, regulates mining activities (to date
limited to exploration) on the international seabed and is
required to take measures necessary to ensure the “effective
protection of the marine environment from harmful effects”, “the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other hazards
to the marine environment” and “the prevention of damage
to the flora and fauna of the marine environment” that might
arise from mining (Levin et al., 2016; UNCLOS, Arts. 137, 145,
153). Moreover, the international community has recognized the
importance of biodiversity conservation more broadly (CBD,
1992; UNGA, 1995, 2006), which should inform the management
of deep-sea mining.
With the prospect of commercial mining approaching,
the ISA is drafting exploitation regulations that also address
environmental considerations. One aspect that the ISA will need
to consider is whether the current best practice of other extractive
industries, specifically the application of the mitigation hierarchy
(IFC, 2012; Ekstrom et al., 2015), can be effectively used in the
vent, seamount, and abyssal deep-sea ecosystems likely to be
affected by mining.
Here we critically address the challenges of applying the
different phases of the mitigation hierarchy to deep-sea mining
with the specific aim of no net loss (NNL) of biodiversity. We
also consider the recent suggestion that biodiversity offsetting
could be employed in the context of deep-seabed mining
(ISA, 2016). We first explore the application of NNL to
the deep ocean and examine possible avenues for avoiding,
minimizing, and remediating adverse effects. We next appraise
the potential of biodiversity offsetting, the last resort in the
tiered mitigation hierarchy, to address residual and unavoidable
harm. Recognizing that the primary obligation of the ISA is to
prevent harm to the marine environment, if deep-sea mining
is allowed to proceed without adhering to an aim of NNL
the benefits arising from any compensatory actions should be
considered to outweigh the losses of deep-sea ecosystems and
services to humankind as a whole. Here we also explore the
difficult question of what considerations ought to be required
of any agreed compensatory action should such a scenario
arise.
DEEP-SEA MINING AND NO NET LOSS
(NNL)
Introduction to NNL
A key tool in environmental management is the mitigation
hierarchy (IFC, 2012), which is applied in environmental
impact assessment (EIA) and management planning, and is
also commonly required by financial institutions and regulatory
frameworks (Figure 1). Based on an assessment of the potential
environmental impacts of an activity, measures to avoid and
then minimize the impacts as far as possible are undertaken.
After this, opportunities to remediate (i.e., reverse the residual
impacts) should be considered before exploring the last resort of
biodiversity offsets to address any unavoidable impacts (Ekstrom
et al., 2015). Offsetting most commonly involves restoration to
assist in the recovery of a quantum of degraded, damaged or
destroyed ecosystem equivalent to that lost; and can be active
(e.g., replanting, construction of artificial habitats) or passive
(e.g., removing threats to promote natural recovery) in nature
(Perrow and Davy, 2002; SER, 2004). Sustainable management of
resource extraction is of increasing importance to governments
and industry alike. In response, aims of NNL or even net gain of
biodiversity have been adopted within some public and private
policies as part of the mitigation hierarchy (Bull et al., 2013;
Le et al., 2017; Niner et al., 2017a). This uptake appears to
be increasing despite limited evidence as to the success of the
mitigation hierarchy and offsets to realize these aims (Maron
et al., 2015b; Gibbons et al., 2017; Lindenmayer et al., 2017).
While not yet applied in deep-seamanagement, NNL is becoming
increasingly accepted by established extractive industries such
as terrestrial mining and oil and gas operations including those
operating offshore in shallower waters (ICMM, 2005; Rio Tinto,
2008; Bayon and Jenkins, 2010; BHP Billiton, 2012; Benabou,
2014; Rainey et al., 2014).
Prospects for NNL in the Deep Sea
Defining what is meant by NNL is critical to its implementation
and assessment; however, this detail is seldom provided in
offsetting policy (Maron et al., 2015a). NNL suggests that
the total “amount” of biodiversity should not be altered
by an activity. However, the term “biodiversity” itself also
requires definition as interpretation can vary across a range
of spatial scales and metrics including those describing genetic
diversity, species richness, evenness, species turnover, habitat
heterogeneity, ecosystem function, and community or taxonomic
distinctness (Sarkar and Margules, 2002; Magurran, 2004). The
data requirements for each of these descriptors may be different
and the acceptability of potential remediation or offsetting
options will vary with the metrics used (Bruggeman et al.,
2005, 2009). For example, NNL of ecosystem function or
functional diversity, as opposed to species richness, allows for
an alternate definition of remediation to include rehabilitation
where the full suite of functions are restored across the region
even in the absence of the return of all original species
(Van Andel et al., 2012). In the case of deep-sea mining,
even if a purely functional definition of NNL were to be
adopted, defining an ecologically relevant measure of extent
and functionality based on current scientific understanding
would be extremely challenging. Furthermore, such definitions
could mask the risk of local and regional species extinctions
and the diminished resilience of ecosystem services (Donohue
et al., 2016). Whatever surrogates and methods are employed
to measure biodiversity changes in the deep sea, they should
be appropriate for assessing management measures and whether
adequate protection is being acheived (Magurran, 1988; Bull
et al., 2016).
Recent correspondence by Van Dover et al. (2017) and others
have questioned the feasibility of an aim of NNL in marine
environments and for the deep-sea mining industry. Specifically,
OECD and IUCN policy guidelines suggest that offsets are
not appropriate where there is uncertainty about the severity,
vulnerability, and irreplaceability of biodiversity components lost
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FIGURE 1 | The mitigation hierarchy as applied in its intended sequence and the challenges posed by deep sea application.
and gained (IUCN, 2016; OECD, 2016). Particular challenges
in the deep ocean relate to the availability of baseline data
(including the large number of unsampled and undescribed
species), current abilities to measure and monitor biodiversity
losses and gains resulting from human activities such as mining,
and a complete lack of proven success in assisted ecological
restoration. Studies of biodiversity in the deep sea are challenging
owing to cost, remoteness, immense spatial scales, processes
that unfold over long time scales (e.g., centuries to millennia
for expected recovery from some deep-sea mining impacts),
and limited expertise. These factors result in a high degree of
uncertainty in (i) local and regional assessments of biodiversity
(active hydrothermal vents on local scales are best known but
still not fully understood); (ii) the effects of human activities
in space and time on biodiversity; and, (iii) the extent to
which components of deep-sea biodiversity are vulnerable and
irreplaceable. Further complicating impact quantification is the
need to account for future scenarios that would unfold in
the absence of the impact or offsetting action; these need
to integrate current and future effects from other ecosystems
stressors such as climate-driven changes (Smith et al., 2008a;
Levin et al., 2016). As a result, there is substantial uncertainty
associated with EIA and consequent implementation of the
mitigation hierarchy for deep-sea projects owing to a lack of
ecological and biogeographic knowledge (Smith et al., 2008a;
Amon et al., 2016; Levin et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2017).
These challenges are compounded by the frequent absence
of defined property rights or effective laws that provide for
the control of access by others to an area. Without the
authority to restrict access to an area, protection for restoration
from other damaging uses such as fishing is not possible.
The combination of these issues complicates each step of the
mitigation hierarchy in deep-sea environments. Indeed, the
Environmental Protection Authority of New Zealand referred to
the inadequate application of the mitigation hierarchy as a reason
for its refusal of the application of Chatham Rock Phosphate
Ltd to mine phosphate off New Zealand (NZ EPA, 2015). The
decision specified the absence of (1) impact quantification, (2)
planned interventions to minimize impacts, and (3) evidence
of the effectiveness of measures to support the reversal of
impacts as contributing to their decision (NZ EPA, 2015;
UNEP-WCMC, 2016). In the next section, we explore these
challenges and conditions for applying the mitigation hierarchy
appropriately.
Exploring the Mitigation Hierarchy in the
Deep Sea
Avoid
The first step in the mitigation hierarchy is avoidance, whereby
a measure, once designed into a project, does not require
continued effort to remove impacts (Bull et al., 2016). Deep-sea
mining will involve direct removal of targeted habitat, yielding
loss, fragmentation, and modification of that habitat as well
as mortality of associated fauna (Ellis, 2001; Van Dover, 2014;
Jones et al., 2017). Given the inevitably destructive nature of
the activity, the avoidance of significant biodiversity losses is
unlikely to be achievable for some or even most projects (Van
Dover et al., 2017). Some impacts might be avoided at a project-
level by reducing the footprint of mining within a contracted
area and/or by leaving some minerals with associated fauna
in place and undisturbed, e.g., through reticulated extraction
patterns that leave large, contiguous areas undisturbed by
direct mining. However, given that many effects of mining will
involve three-dimensional, diffuse, poorly understood, and wide-
ranging impacts from sediment plumes, toxicity and noise, the
identification of refuge areas free from damaging impacts will
not be straight-forward (Ellis, 2001; Thiel et al., 2001; Van Dover,
2014). This is evidenced by the inability to identify control sites
unaffected by the resettlement of material in the Disturbance
and recolonoization (DISCOL) experiment conducted to help
evaluate potential deep-sea mining impacts (Thiel et al., 2001).
Identification of such refugia will require both modeling and
in-situ studies at multiple levels and over various time frames
(e.g., the expected decadal duration of nodule mining), to
include project, regional, and cumulative impacts. The regulatory
framework will need to be both precautionary and adaptive to
allow responses such as the cessation/relocation of mining or
the modification of impact-free refugia as new data become
available and prior to reaching the point of serious harm (Levin
et al., 2016). Nonetheless, even with plume management and
impact-free refugia, negative impacts, and biodiversity loss will
be unavoidable.
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Minimize
The second step in the mitigation hierarchy is to minimize
losses of biodiversity and other ecosystem damage to the
greatest extent possible. Minimizationmeasures include activities
that require on-going activity to reduce the significance of
impacts (Bull et al., 2016). In the case of deep-sea mining,
technologies and practices might be developed and applied to
reduce these risks. For example, sediment plumes generated
during mineral extraction are considered to be a source of
major risk to deep-sea ecosystems resulting in, among other
effects, the burial and clogging of animals’ feeding apparatus.
Investing in engineering design and in situ testing of mining
tools, including installation and testing of shrouds on cutters, and
minimizing the creation of pulverized finematerial, might reduce
sediment plume dispersion and the spatial extent and temporal
persistence of some plume impacts. Other technical innovations
might include the design of vehicles to reduce compaction
of the seabed and turbulence, or a change in waste disposal
techniques to reduce ecotoxicological effects. However, because
the industry is in its infancy, the effectiveness of such measures
in reducing losses of biodiversity remains wholly untested. Again,
regulatory mechanisms, including environmental objectives with
precautionary indicators, will be necessary to stimulate the
innovation and uptake of improved technologies. Despite the
potential to reduce impacts in the future, the destructive nature
of mining indicates that current technologies will be unable
to avert significant local biodiversity losses through avoidance
and minimization. Species extinction rates typically increase
exponentially with the percentage of essential habitat lost (Ney-
Nifle and Mangel, 2000); thus, biodiversity loss from mining
is likely to scale to the ratio of habitat area impacted to the
total area of that habitat within the biogeographical province.
Biodiversity loss will also be affected by levels of abundance and
endemism within a habitat, and rates of population connectivity
(Ney-Nifle and Mangel, 2000). To account for these varying
impact pathways, minimization efforts should incorporate spatial
planning that considers species ranges, habitat distributions, and
patterns of connectivity to determine where and how much
mining will be allowed to occur (e.g., to avoid massive habitat
loss within a single biogeographic province leading to extinction
of species requiring that habitat).
Remediate
The third step of the mitigation hierarchy, remediation, seeks
to address losses of biodiversity associated with mining after the
first two steps of the mitigation hierarchy have been considered
and implemented to the greatest extent possible. Remediation
under an aim of NNL implies that a reversal of damages incurred
by the associated activity is required and feasible (Bull et al.,
2016). Requirements for post-mining site remediation are now
commonplace for terrestrial projects (Lamb et al., 2015) but a
similar approach for the deep sea will face numerous challenges.
These challenges include the slow recruitment and growth of
the native species that occur in target habitats (manganese
nodule fields, seamounts, and sulfide deposits), the potentially
vast scales of mining impacts, the limited understanding of
the requirements for proper ecosystem function, and the likely
high cost of deployment of assisted regeneration strategies and
monitoring in the deep sea (Van Dover et al., 2014). Effectiveness
and practicability of any remediation technologies or methods
at the scale required to address deep-sea mining impacts and
achieve NNL has not been demonstrated. Remediation for
nodulemining is especially problematic considering the temporal
and spatial scales involved. For example, one 30-year nodule
mining operation may involve a contract area of 75,000 km2
roughly the size of Austria or Tasmania, with direct impacts
potentially affecting 20–30% of this area (Smith et al., 2008b).
There is little evidence of recovery of biodiversity in nodule
beds following relatively small-scale, low-intensity disturbances,
even after several decades (Miljutin et al., 2011; Vanreusel et al.,
2016; Jones et al., 2017). While a nascent academic field of
deep-sea benthic assisted restoration science exists (Strömberg
et al., 2010; MERCES, 20171), that work is decades away
from contributing reliably and responsibly to industrial-scale
reduction of biodiversity loss, and it is still unclear whether deep-
sea restoration is feasible at all. Although the technology for
remediation may appear relatively simple in some respects, for
example deploying simulated nodules to the seafloor in mined
areas, the remediation scales (of order 10,000 km2) are daunting,
the efficacy of remediation approaches is unknown and will
require decades to evaluate (due to the very slow recovery rates of
abyssal communities) and run a high risk of failure which could
implicate further biodiversity loss.
Even if benthic remediation were technically feasible, it would
be further complicated by the extended timespans over which
financial commitment would be required. The long recovery
periods of most deep-sea environments (excluding some active
vent fields), likely to be in the order of decades to centuries, would
extend beyond the duration of typical mining contracts. The
question then arises as to where responsibility for remediation
of a former mine site lies once a mining contract has expired
but commitments remain outstanding. An increasing concern
with schemes for ecological remediation of terrestrial mine sites,
where development consent conditions often require a return
to pre-impact ecological condition post activity, relates to the
“selling off” of concessions and accompanying environmental
liabilities to smaller, less financially stable companies. Smaller
companies may be less likely to possess the required expertise,
experience, and financial resources to manage the long-term
commitment posed by remediation (Lamb et al., 2015). In the
case of deep-sea mining in the Area it would be the responsibility
of the ISA, together with the relevant sponsoring state, to ensure
all long-term environmental commitments by the contractor
are sustained, even beyond the contractual period. This may
require the use of environmental bonds or similar financial
instruments (ISA, 2017) to ensure the contractor is not able
to shift responsibility to another entity. Given these ecological,
practical and legal challenges, it is likely that residual significant
impacts will remain after the first three steps of mitigation
hierarchy have been implemented, leading to a potential reliance
on biodiversity offsets to meet an aim of NNL, but these too may
prove problematic.
1Available online at: http://www.merces-project.eu/?q=content/about-project
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BIODIVERSITY OFFSETTING IN THE DEEP
SEA
Biodiversity offsets are, the last resort of the mitigation hierarchy
and are employed to manage residual impacts after the full and
robust implementation of avoidance andminimization strategies.
They are considered to be “measurable conservation outcomes
resulting from actions designed to compensate for residual
biodiversity impacts arising from project development after
appropriate prevention and mitigation actions have been taken”
(BBOP, 2012), with “demonstrably quantifiable equivalence
between what is lost and gained” (Bull et al., 2016). The
three criteria central to an aim of NNL include the prediction
and measurement of biodiversity changes (losses and gains),
the provision of evidence to support claims of additionality,
and ecological equivalence. These criteria, particularly that
of additionality, are designed to ensure that the net balance
of biodiversity is only ever measured against the scenario
most likely to have occurred in the absence of impact or
compensatory intervention (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006). The
strict application of these criteria, essential to realize an aim
of NNL and to avoid offset misuse, have been found to be
challenging in marine contexts (UNEP-WCMC, 2016; Niner
et al., 2017b).
Possible Biodiversity Offsets for the Deep
Sea
The gaps in current ecological knowledge and restoration abilities
in the deep sea are also inconsistent with use of assisted
biodiversity recovery as an appropriate offset mechanism. As
such, offsetting through averting loss might present the only
option by which the condition of equivalence could currently
be addressed. This averted loss offsetting mechanism is meant
to create biodiversity benefit by protecting biodiversity that in
the absence of the action, would have been lost. The effect is
thus to improve current negative trends in biodiversity of a
type similar to that lost. Averted loss benefits arise by removing
ecosystem threats, preventing harm from other human activities
not associated with the project in question, and in some cases
by allowing for natural remediation (Ekstrom et al., 2015). For
habitats where seabedmining is likely to be the only major threat,
averted loss offsets would not be possible. Such habitats include
nodule fields or SMS deposits.
However, averted loss offsets might, in theory, be plausible
for crust mining as some seamounts are threatened by mining
and fishing. Therefore, biodiversity loss attributed to mining
could conceivably be offset by protecting equivalent unmined
areas from the impacts of bottom-contact fishing and future
exploitation through mining. However, the additionality of
these efforts would be difficult to establish in light of the
United Nations General Assembly resolutions which already
commit states to “prevent significant adverse impacts” on
vulnerable marine ecosystems, including seamounts, from the
impacts of deep-sea fisheries (UNGA, 2006). These commitments
have been translated into binding regulations by most of
the regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs)
with the legal competence to manage bottom fisheries on
the high seas (Gianni et al., 2016). Further, unlike on land
where property rights commonly exist, the ability of one
international agency (e.g., the ISA) to restrict activities regulated
by another competent organization (e.g., RFMOs) in the Area is
limited. Accordingly, “buying out” industry players with access
to an area would provide little guarantee of protection in
areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) if others unaffected
by the financial transaction could move into the protected
area (Table 1). Given that the ISA has limited jurisdiction
applying only to activities associated with seafloor minerals,
protecting an area through preventing access would only be
possible through international agreement (such as through
measures adopted by the relevant RFMO) and only if effective
enforcement mechanisms existed. The developing treaty on
biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) may provide a
more coordinated approach to the establishment of area-based
measures for the protection ofmarine biodiversity, but at present,
such coordination would have to proceed on a very slow and
labor intensive case-by-case basis (Freestone et al., 2014).
Offsetting through averted loss could also theoretically apply
if an area to be mined is converted to a no-mining area. However,
as the seafloor is presently under exploration only and there
is no exploitation contract in place in the Area, proving that
likely exploitation has been averted will be difficult. Protection
of important or significant areas inside mining areas may
also be a required component of a contractor’s environmental
management plan (EMP) to preserve rare or fragile ecosystems
and for long-term scientific research and monitoring. A further
challenge results from the requirement of contractors to setup
preservation reference zones in their claim areas. These zones will
need to be ecologically similar to mined areas, but unperturbed
by mining, in order to monitor mining impacts (ISA, 2010, 2011,
2012, 2013). However, because unimpacted reference zones are
already required by ISA guidelines, they do not provide the
additionality required to be considered as an offset.
Extending or increasing these Preservation Reference Zones
beyond what will be contractually required within mining
concessions could, however, present an option for offsetting
biodiversity losses if it could be shown that there was a
real (direct or indirect) risk of their future degradation from
mining impacts. Without ascertaining this additionality these
measures might be used to effectively mask biodiversity losses
through “protecting” areas that weren’t economically attractive to
industry and therefore unlikely to be threatened (Table 1). This
approach has been adopted by Nautilus Minerals Niugini Ltd,
where predicted biodiversity losses associated with the Solwara
I project have been “mitigated” to provide colonists to assist with
post-mining regeneration (there was no requirement to meet
an aim of NNL) by leaving a nearby site, South Su, unmined
(Coffey Natural Systems Pty Ltd, 2008). Notwithstanding the fact
that Solwara I and South Su feature different assemblages and
so would unlikely meet an aim of NNL, in order for this to be
considered as an offset, evidence to prove that South Su would
otherwise be targeted for mining is required.
Offset Misuse
The term “biodiversity offset” is frequently misapplied and
misused (Bull et al., 2016). True offsets require the provision
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TABLE 1 | Options for the final step of the mitigation hierarchy and barriers to their effective application in the deep sea.
Compensatory mechanism type Barriers to application in the deep sea
Offset “Like for like” averted loss of biodiversity through the
protection of a similar type and equivalent amount of
habitat under threat from other existing or planned
activities. For example, the removal of bottom trawling
pressures to offset mining impacts on seamounts.
Lack of data and agreed surrogates to establish ecological equivalence
between biodiversity lost and that restored.
Difficulty in proving that in the absence of action, under the most likely
future scenario, this biodiversity is likely to be lost and as such equals a
bona fide gain in biodiversity.
Absence of legal mechanism to limit access.
Need for complex and long-term monitoring and compliance regime.
Need for long-term significant financial commitment.
Offset “Like for like” habitat restoration to create/restore
new, additional and equivalent biodiversity of a similar
type in a different location to that lost to ensure no net
loss.
Lack of data and agreed surrogates to establish ecological equivalence
between biodiversity lost and that restored.
Lack of spatial data to locate and identify degraded similar habitat to
that damaged by mining project for restoration.
Restoration of deep-sea biodiversity within appropriate space and time
scales currently considered unfeasible in most cases.
Restoration techniques are unproven and the efficacy of any efforts are
likely to be uncertain for many decades.
Need for long-term significant financial commitment.
Limited legal mechanisms to limit disturbance by other human
activities.
Need for long-term significant financial commitment.
Compensation “Out of kind” habitat restoration to create new,
additional and equivalent biodiversity of a different type
and/or in a different location such as in shallow or
coastal environments.
Lack of data and agreed surrogates to establish ecological equivalence
between biodiversity lost and that restored.
Inconsistencies with the UNCLOS obligation to “ensure effective
protection of the marine environment from harmful effects” of
mining-related activities in the Area.
Low level of proven success of marine ecological restoration
techniques for any habitat or species, particularly at large scales; any
efforts are likely to be associated with high uncertainty.
Need for long-term significant financial commitment.
Limited legal mechanisms to limit disturbance by other human
activities.
Need for long-term significant financial commitment.
Lack of competence of the ISA to mandate habitat restoration in areas
within national jurisdiction.
Restoring habitat within national jurisdiction in order to compensate for
habitat loss in the area is unlikely to fulfill expectations under the
principle of common heritage of mankind (i.e., it is effectively a transfer
of wealth from the international community to recipient coastal states).
No societal mandate, or scientific rationale, to support trading up or
across habitats, ecosystems, or biogeographic provinces and to
accept residual losses of deep-sea biodiversity.
Shift in ethical basis of conservation whereby the presence of “easy”
alternatives degrades barriers previously based on moral objections to
the biodiversity loss.
Compensation Additional actions that do not seek equivalence or
provide biodiversity gains ecologically linked to
biodiversity losses, such as capacity building.
Lack of data to establish financial equivalent (such as through an
ecosystem services evaluation).
Inconsistencies with the UNCLOS obligation to “ensure effective
protection of the marine environment from harmful effects” from
mining-related activities in the Area.
Issues of additionality whereby any such compensation would have to
be above any monetary and non-monetary benefit shared by
contractors based on royalties, profits etc. from mineral extraction in
the Area, and any compensation would have to be reinvested in a way
that benefits mankind as a whole.
No societal mandate to support a net biodiversity loss.
Shift in ethical basis of conservation whereby the presence of “easy”
alternatives degrades barriers previously based on moral objections to
the biodiversity loss.
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of new and additional biodiversity benefits and “measurable
and commensurate gains” (Bull et al., 2016). “In kind” or
“like for like” offsets refer to conservation actions designed
to benefit a similar habitat or the same species/communities,
allowing for an assessment of ecological equivalence (Table 1).
Where equivalence is not demonstrated, such activities cannot
be referred to as offsets and should be more accurately termed
compensatory measures (Bull et al., 2016). Determining whether
a gain in one type of biodiversity compensates for the loss of
another type is probably not scientifically or ethically justifiable
in the deep sea, especially given the uncertainties that pervade
such environments (Table 1). This issue becomes increasingly
scientifically challenging as the ecological and evolutionary
distance between a mining impact area and an “out of kind”
compensation action increases, especially if the actions ultimately
promote ecosystem functions and services that fundamentally
differ from those that were lost. “Out of kind” measures should
not be called biodiversity offsets as these involve a trade across
dissimilar biodiversity, where losses of one biodiversity type are
accepted in place of benefits for different habitats, species and/or
communities. Accepting and clearly communicating that these
“out of kind” actions do not offset biodiversity loss is important
to avoid misinterpretation of the trade-offs and losses implicated
in decisions to progress with deep-sea mining projects.
“Trading up,” a controversial and “out of kind” conservation
action to yield gains in biodiversity in areas considered to be of
higher conservation value (BBOP, 2012), has been proposed as
a compensatory action, incorrectly labeled as a possible offset,
for impacts associated with deep-sea mining. For example, it has
been suggested that damage in the deep sea from mining (which
will inevitably involve biodiversity loss) might be compensated
or offset through an “International Marine Mitigation Bank”
(ECO, 2016; ISA, 2016; Fish Reef Project, 2017), which deploys
“reef balls”—concrete substrata—to promote coral-reef habitat
and biodiversity in shallow-water ecosystems. This and other
“trading-up” practices assume that loss of largely unknown
species and ecosystems in the deep sea can be exchanged for
protecting biodiversity elsewhere. From a scientific perspective,
such an assumption is highly questionable. In our view, the
relationship between any gain in biodiversity in a shallow-water
coral-reef setting and loss of biodiversity in the deep sea is
too ambiguous to be scientifically meaningful and cannot be
considered to be offsetting deep-sea biodiversity loss (Table 1).
Moreover, compensating biodiversity loss in the Area with
environmental restoration in coastal waters is legally problematic
because the ISA’s jurisdiction is limited to the Area. Additionally,
under the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind,
measurable benefits of mining activities on the international
seabed, which include those relating to biodiversity, must accrue
to the international community as a whole and particularly
to developing states (Jaeckel et al., 2016; UNCLOS, Art. 150).
Compensating a few coastal states for a loss of biodiversity that
occurs in areas beyond their national jurisdictions would in effect
constitute a transfer of natural wealth. Such a scheme appears
contrary to the historic intentions of UNCLOS (Nandan et al.,
2002) and the Common Heritage of Mankind principle wherein
the ISA acts as a trustee formankind in perpetuity with benefits to
be shared equitably (Wolfrum, 1983). These legal concerns may
not apply where both mining and a “trading-up” conservation
action take place in national waters, although the scientific and
ethical concerns remain.
Similarly, no-mining areas, referred to by the ISA as “Areas of
Particular Environmental Interest” (APEIs) (ISA, 2011; Wedding
et al., 2015) have been incorrectly characterized by some as
“strategic offsets” in international waters (Johnson and Ferreira,
2015; IUCN, 2016). Notably, they do not provide new and
additional biodiversity benefits and thus do not actually offset
residual losses of biodiversity that might be incurred by a mining
project. Therefore, these are more accurately seen, not as offsets,
but as part of a conservation plan to avoid irreversible harm from
the extirpation of species or loss of ecosystem function in the
mining region.
NET LOSS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Industrial-scale remediation is not demonstrated and likely not
feasible, and offsets are impossible, as such it can be reasonably
expected that deep-sea mining will result in a net loss of
biodiversity in the direct mining footprint and for some distance
around it (Levin et al., 2016; Van Dover et al., 2017). These losses
may well be irreversible on timescales relevant to management
and possibly for many human generations (Amon et al., 2016;
Vanreusel et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2017). If neighboring areas are
protected from mining and its effects (such as through APEIs),
these can be expected to mitigate the ecological damage on
a regional scale, and may assist in some local re-colonization
and regeneration. Such no-mining areas can be expected to
feature as an important mechanism to avoid and minimize some
biodiversity loss. However, despite their advantages, protected
areas cannot be expected prima facie to avert all biodiversity
losses associated with mining. Furthermore, protected areas
cannot be construed as being offsets because no new gains in
biodiversity will have been created.
Owing to our current limited knowledge of deep-sea
ecosystem structure and function, we cannot determine the
significance and therefore acceptability of the likely biodiversity
losses associated with deep-seabed mining. In the face of our
ignorance, the precautionary principle requires that we consider
the potentially irreversible consequences of any decisions
made and ensure that sufficient procedural, substantive, and
institutional measures are in place to avoid serious harm
(Jaeckel et al., 2017). This would include a transparent and
consultative approach to the development of deep-sea mineral
exploitation regulations with experts and stakeholders to specify
how biodiversity will be measured with sufficient statistical
power, what level of net loss of biodiversity and accompanying
ecosystem function might be deemed acceptable, and what form
of compensation will be provided for the harm that is caused.
Potential Compensatory Actions
While we consider the risks to biodiversity loss from deep-
sea mining to be high, the push within the ISA to develop
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exploitation regulations indicates that the industry may be
progressed prior to an open dialogue on whether such
biodiversity losses are ecologically or economically justifiable in
terms of its benefit to humankind as a whole (Kim, 2017).
Should deep-sea biodiversity losses and the associated risks
of degraded ecosystem services through mining be found to
be both justifiable and acceptable, then it is possible, despite
scientific concerns, that “out of kind” compensation will be
stipulated at the fourth and final stage of themitigation hierarchy.
Given the difficulty in quantifying equivalence across different
ecosystems and types of biodiversity, the outcomes of potential
compensatory actions may be reduced to financial rather than
ecological benefits. The quantification of financial sums would
need to be linked to the value of biodiversity loss, calculated based
in part on the total value (both instrumental and intrinsic) of the
natural capital lost. Based on the Common Heritage of Mankind,
the interests of society as a whole, including lost opportunities
to future generations, must also be included in such assessment.
Given the importance of deep-sea ecosystem services, the levels
of evolutionary novelty, and the challenges of restoration as
outlined, calculations would be complex and the sums could
conceivably be immense.
Ethically, potential compensatory actions beg the difficult
question: is one form of life, or evolutionary pathway, equivalent
to another? Can the living elements of biodiversity be treated,
and traded, as though part of a single currency, even though
each species, habitat and evolutionary pathway is unique? And
if so, how will the exchange values be set? Can the preservation
and recovery of one form of life legitimize the destruction of
others (Soulé, 1985)? A further concern is that the acceptance of
loss during a biodiversity trade engenders a shift in the ethics of
biodiversity protection previously based on moral objection (Ives
and Bekessy, 2015; Spash, 2015) and reduces societal pressures to
reject proposals with associated environmental damage (Table 1).
Finally, establishing a marketplace on nature assumes that when
components from one ecosystem are exchanged for others, the
outcomes are manageable (i.e., the currency allows for easy and
equal exchange between units). Unpleasant, possibly irreversible,
“surprises” that characterize complex systems built upon unique
components, such as found in deep-sea environments, are not
taken into account to allow for trading to take place.
If potential compensatory actions are required, these should
be limited to actions that benefit the understanding and
conservation of deep-sea biodiversity. Capacity building for
deep-sea biodiversity research and conservation is one such
measure. Again, any capacity-building action on the part of a
contractor would have to be in addition to the capacity building
already required by the sponsoring State or ISA (ISA, 2010,
2012, 2013). Investment in research on biodiversity in the deep
sea, including advancing understanding of minimization and
remediation of mining disturbances, might serve as a potential
compensatory action. However, to qualify as a compensatory
action, these research activities would need to supplement those
required for baseline studies, and for the development of EIAs
and monitoring, which are already contractor responsibilities.
For example, potential compensatory actions might include
biodiversity research at regional scales (i.e., outside claim areas
and within APEIs) to provide a broader biogeographic context
for interpreting the consequences of mining on biodiversity, test
the efficacy of protected-area networks, or to assess the risks of
species extinctions (e.g., through quantification of connectivity,
and plume contaminant and sound dispersal). Various fund
schemes that would charge entities inflicting damage on the
seabed to support relevant research on biodiversity in the deep
sea have been proposed as possible conservation actions (Barbier
et al., 2014; Mengerink et al., 2014; Johnson and Ferreira, 2015).
The need for funding of new research, rather than that already
required under national laws, the Law of the Sea, and the ISA’s
Mining Code, will need to be addressed through clear criteria in
guidelines and regulations to avoid the displacement of existing
commitments. We suggest that this research should have the goal
of developing new knowledge and capacity to protect the marine
environment. However, it should always be recognized that this
additional capacity has been built on the premise of accepted
deep-sea biodiversity loss.
CONCLUSIONS
As exploitation regulations are developed, and contracts for
commercial mining in the Area are considered, the inability
to achieve and verify a goal of NNL through the mitigation
hierarchy should be broadly recognized and debated. If mining
is permitted and losses accepted, national governments, the
ISA, and deep-sea mining contractors will need to focus even
greater attention on the preventive steps of the mitigation
hierarchy (avoidance and minimization) using a precautionary
and adaptive approach. This should be accompanied by research
inside and outside mining areas that add to our knowledge and
capacity to better understand and protect deep-sea biodiversity,
and that is additional to pre-existing legal requirements (Rainey
et al., 2014). Such an approach could involve a staged approach
to permitting the development of the industry with a number
of small sites of perceived lower risk being exploited to develop
mitigatory technologies and to monitor and test predicted
impacts (Tinch and van den Hove, 2016). Improved knowledge
obtained from a staged strategy should inform the progression of
the industry, with future stages of exploitation being contingent
on the successful ability to predict and take action to minimize
impacts and associated biodiversity loss.
Given the very slow natural rates of recovery in most deep-
sea ecosystems targeted for mining, loss of biodiversity in the
deep sea is inevitable and may be considered to be “forever” on
human time scales. In effect, the actions of one generation will
affect the common heritage of humankind for many generations
to come. To avoid, or at least ameliorate this inter-generational
inequity, deep-sea mining should yield demonstrable economic
benefits, as well as benefits from compensatory measures for
current and future generations. The ecological consequences of
a net loss of biodiversity in the deep sea are poorly understood
and approaches for avoidance and minimization of losses remain
limited and unproven. As the ISA develops regulations for
seabed mining, it is essential that the potential significance and
consequences of this loss (including for future generations) are
clearly communicated, understood and taken into account. Given
the potential scale of harm, this matter is deserving of wider
inclusive debate, both within the ISA and internationally. The
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scale of biodiversity loss that may be associated with some types
of deep-seabed mining and the very limited ability to understand,
remediate and offset these losses in “like for like” settings may
well preclude their scientific or social acceptance.
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